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Abstract: This paper exploits a natural policy experiment to directly identify the crowding out effects of 
public transfers on the incidence and level of private transfers. The introduction of a large social security 
program in Taiwan is used to estimate the effect of an exogenous increase in government transfer 
payments to the elderly on the private transfer behavior of their adult children. Using an instrumental 
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Determining the impact of public transfer programs on private transfer behavior is a
key issue from both a research and policy perspective. If public transfers largely crowd
out private transfers, then the welfare impact of social redistributive programs will be
smaller than perceived. Economic theory is ambiguous in its predictions about crowding
out. The altruism model developed in the seminal papers of Barro (1974) and Becker
(1974), predicts essentially complete crowding out. The model focuses on transfers from
parents to children, but can be applied equally well to transfers from adult children
to their elderly parents. In the model, the child’s utility is included in an altruistic
parent’s utility function, which gives the parent an incentive to support the child. The
core of the altruism model is the prediction of redistribution neutrality, which posits
that the parents will adjust their transfer behavior in response to changes in the child’s
income. For example, an increase in the child’s income due to welfare subsidies from the
government will lower the amount of parental transfers. If Ricardian Equivalence holds
and the government subsidy is ﬁnanced by a tax on the parents’ income, then the parents
will reduce their transfer exactly by the tax amount, implying complete crowding out.
In contrast to the altruism model, the exchange model of Bernheim et al. (1985) and
Cox (1987) argues that a child’s services to the parents, such as contacts and visits, are
at least in part, ﬁnancially motivated, as the child expects monetary compensation. In
this model, the amount of transfers could be a positive or negative function of the child’s
income. As the child’s income increases, the opportunity cost of services increases, and
thus, the amount of expected compensation for the services increases. In such a setting,
the relationship between the child’s income and the amount of parental transfers is not
clear. It could be positive if the parents’ demand for services is inelastic, as they would
need to increase transfer payments to the child in order to receive the same level of
services. If this were the case, government subsidies would increase the amount of private
transfers received and thus, there would be no crowding eﬀect. On the other hand, if
the demand for services is highly elastic, then parents’ demand would fall along with
2monetary compensation, which would lead to crowding out.1
As a result of the ambiguous eﬀect of crowding out predicted by theory, a relatively
large empirical literature has focused on the estimation of both the sign and magnitude
of the crowding-out eﬀect of public transfer programs. However, due to data limitations,
most empirical studies have not been able to directly measure the crowding out eﬀect
of public redistribution programs. Most studies in this literature have attempted to
indirectly measure the impact of such programs on beneﬁciaries by studying the response
of private transfers to changes in the recipient’s level of income. The results from these
papers, however, are not consistent. Some studies have found a positive income eﬀect on
private transfers (Cox, 1987; Cox, 1990; Cox and Rank, 1992) while others have found
a small, negative eﬀect (Altonji et al., 1997; Cox and Jappelli, 1990; Hochguertel and
Ohlsson, 2009; Kazianga, 2006; McGarry and Schoeni, 1995; McGarry, 2000).
In this paper we exploit a natural policy experiment and a novel dataset to directly
identify the crowding out eﬀect of a large social welfare program on the incidence and
level of private transfers. The setting of our study is the country of Taiwan, which
implemented a large social security program in 2002 called the Senior Citizen Welfare
Living Allowance that covered a signiﬁcant fraction of the elderly population. Using
the parameters of this program, and a nationally representative dataset that contains
information on monetary transfers from children to elderly parents before and after the
introduction of the program, along with a rich set of socio-demographic and ﬁnancial
variables to alleviate potential bias from omitted variables, we are able to estimate the
eﬀect of an exogenous increase in government transfer payments to the elderly on the
private transfer behavior of their adult children. The empirical results show strong
evidence of crowding out on the extensive margin (the probability of providing a positive
transfer), and weaker evidence of crowding out on the intensive margin (the amount of
the transfer conditional on it being positive). According to the estimates, the probability
that an adult child provides monetary transfers to his or her parents decreases by 50% if
1For a more detailed discussion of microeconomic models of family transfers, see Laferr` ere and Wolﬀ
(2006).
3the parents receive public assistance. Taking into account the intensive margin, we ﬁnd
complete crowding out of private transfers, although the intensive margin results are
imprecisely estimated. In addition, we ﬁnd that the crowding out eﬀect is substantially
stronger for children who live with their parents and somewhat weaker for male children.
There are only a handful of previous studies in the literature that attempt to directly
identify the crowding out eﬀect of public redistribution programs, and they have found
mixed results. Cox and Jimenez (1992) was one of the ﬁrst of these studies. Using
data from Peru, they found evidence that households receiving social security income
were signiﬁcantly less likely to receive positive transfers from children.2 However, the
eﬀect of receiving social security income on the amount of transfers received (conditional
on receiving a positive transfer) was small and positive. The authors speculated that
the estimated positive eﬀect was due to the omission of donor income, which created
an upward bias. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) examined the crowding out eﬀect of
beneﬁts from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) on shared housing
and ﬁnancial support from parents. Their ﬁndings suggested only a small trade-oﬀ
between public assistance and parental support.
There is a serious econometric issue that all of these studies face however: the lack
of income data for both the recipient and donor and the potential endogeneity of el-
igibility. An individual’s decision to apply for government transfer programs and the
size of the beneﬁts received likely depends on whether the individual is expecting or
receiving private transfers. In turn, the amount of private transfers received depends
on the income of both the recipient and the donor, but that information has proven
diﬃcult to obtain. Rarely has a dataset had information regarding both variables, and
thus, omitted variable bias is an important concern in these studies. Most recent papers
in this literature have focused on this issue. Cox and Jakubson (1995) constructed a
proxy for donor income and used an IV approach to address the endogeneity of various
sources of public transfer income. Using the 1979 President’s Commission on Pension
2At the sample means, receiving social security income reduced the probability of transfer receipt
by 8 percentage points.
4Policy Survey, they found that public transfers only marginally reduce private transfers.
Schoeni (2002) used the 1988 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to
examine the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on private transfers. He used state-speciﬁc
policy parameters to instrument for the eligibility of receiving unemployment beneﬁts
and found a sizeable crowding out eﬀect: a one dollar increase in unemployment income
reduced family transfers by about 40 cents. Moreover, the estimated crowding out eﬀect
obtained using IV estimation was signiﬁcantly larger than the eﬀect obtained using sim-
ple ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation, and thus the endogeneity of participation in
the unemployment beneﬁts program led to an underestimate of the crowding out eﬀect.
Jensen (2004) analyzed how an expansion in pension beneﬁts in South Africa aﬀected
the size of remittance payments given to elderly individuals. To identify the eﬀect, he
applied a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach, which used pension disconti-
nuities at gender diﬀerentiated age thresholds along with time-series variation in pension
beneﬁts. His estimates imply that a one dollar increase in pension income leads to a
0.25 − 0.30 cent reduction in private transfers received from children. The most recent
study in the literature, and the analysis closest in methodology to ours, was conducted
by Juarez (2009). Juarez also exploited a policy change to address the endogeneity of
public transfers, focusing on a public program introduced in Mexico City that provided
monthly transfers to individuals aged 70 years or more. Juarez used an IV Tobit regres-
sion speciﬁcation to estimate the eﬀect, and found strong evidence of crowding out (an
additional peso of income reduced total cash transfers by 86 cents).3
Like Jensen (2004) and Juarez (2009), this study uses an exogenous policy change
to identify the crowding out eﬀect of public redistribution programs on private transfer
payments to the elderly. But, in our opinion, this paper has some advantages over the
previous literature. First, the dataset used in this study (the Panel Study of Family
Dynamics, or PSFD) is nationally representative, and the policy change was to a large
3The instruments for individuals’ income without private transfers include triple interaction terms
of a dummy for being at least 70 years old, with a dummy for Mexico City resident, and a dummy for
each year after the program started (2002 and 2004).
5percentage of the elderly Taiwanese population (aged 65 and above). In contrast, the data
used in Jensen (2004) was collected in Venda, a rural and low-employment area in South
Africa that is likely not representative of populations in more developed countries. The
public transfer program studied by Juarez (2009) only aﬀected elderly residents in Mexico
City, and because of budget constraints, the program only covered poor neighborhoods
in its early stages. A second advantage is the fact that we are able to precisely identify
both the donor and the recipient of private transfers. The respondents in the PSFD
are the donors (adult children), who provide detailed information regarding monetary
transfers to their elderly parents. Moreover, the respondents report whether they share
housing with their parents, and thus, we are able to analyze the eﬀect of the government
transfer program on both inter- and intra-family transfers.4 The PSFD data also allow
us to control for numerous socio-demographic characteristics of both the donors and
recipients. Finally, in addition to these advantages, our paper shares one of the important
advantages of the Juarez study: the crowding eﬀect is evaluated at the individual level
as opposed to the household level. As Juarez explains, many studies have rejected the
unitary model of the household. If households do not pool their income together, then
the eﬀect on the outcome variable will depend on whose income increases within the
household.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion of the
background of the Senior Citizens Welfare Living Allowance, which is the social insurance
program that we focus on in this paper; section 3 provides a detailed discussion of the
PSFD data and our empirical strategy; section 4 presents the estimation results for the
full sample as well as for various subsamples of interest; and section 5 concludes.
4In Juarez’s data, the role of respondents are receivers (the elderly) and there is no information on
the source of private transfers and on the transfers between household members. Intrafamily transfers
might be important given that only 25% of elders live alone in Mexico City.
62. Background
2.1. Aging Population
Over the past few decades Taiwan has experienced a rapidly aging population. In
1993, the population above 65 years old reached 7% of the total population, which
according to the United Nations, is a benchmark of an old age society. Since the early
1990s, the elderly population has steadily increased. According to the Ministry of the
Interior (MOI), by 2009 it had reached 2.4 million, accounting for approximately 10.6%
of the total population.
In order to meet the social, physical and economic needs of its growing elderly pop-
ulation, over the past decade the Taiwanese government has expanded and introduced
various social beneﬁt programs. These include the expansion of medical allowances and
stabilized living allowances, and the introduction of several insurance and pension pro-
grams. In October 2008, the government combined several programs for the elderly and
implemented the National Pension Program with the goal of increasing the standard of
living of its retired population. Before the introduction of these programs, the elderly
population in Taiwan depended primarily on their children for ﬁnancial support. In
1999, about 73% of elders lived with their children and about 52% reported that children
were their main source of income (MOI). Although more and more of the elderly choose
to live alone and the introduction of these government programs has alleviated some of
their ﬁnancial stress, as of 2005, approximately 61% of seniors were still living with their
children and 53% relied primarily on their children for ﬁnancial support.5
2.2. Senior Citizens Welfare Living Allowance
The precursor to the National Pension Program was the Senior Citizen Welfare Liv-
ing Allowance, which was implemented in 2002. This program, which was developed for
senior citizens who were not covered by other social insurance programs at the time,
5About 33% of Taiwanese seniors in 2005 reported that their primary source of income came from
government transfers.
7is the focus of our study. Citizens who were at least 65 years old and who resided in
Taiwan for more than 183 days per year for the previous three years qualiﬁed for the
program.6 Beneﬁciaries of the program received a monthly transfer of NT$3,000 (ap-
proximately $100 dollars), which represents approximately 10% of the average monthly
income for qualiﬁed seniors in our data. There was a cap on beneﬁciaries’ gross income
of NT$5,000,000, and a cap on the value of land and property owned of NT$500,000.
However, these thresholds are quite high relative to the distribution of senior income and
wealth in Taiwan. About 81% of seniors in our data have total income lower than the cap
on gross income. Moreover, in the 2004 wave of the PSFD, about 81% of respondents
reported that the property values owned by their parents were below the cap. Thus,
eligibility for the Allowance program depends primarily on citizens’ age.
The program oﬃcially took eﬀect on May 22, 2002, but the allowance was made
retroactive to January 1, 2002 for seniors who applied before August 31, 2002. Potential
beneﬁciaries had to ﬁle applications to their local government oﬃce, which then veriﬁed
the application documents and submitted them to the Bureau of Labor for further exam-
ination and oﬃcial approval.7 Upon approving an application, the government deposited
the monthly allowance directly to the beneﬁciary’s bank account.8 Thus, transaction
costs after approval are nearly zero. The program covered approximately 425,000 seniors
in 2002, and by 2007, that number nearly doubled to almost 850,000, which accounted
for approximately 35% of the entire elderly population in Taiwan. However, it accounted
for a much larger percentage of the non-farming elderly population as the Senior Farmers
Welfare Allowance, which covered elderly farmers, accounted for approximately 29% of
the senior Taiwanese population. Seniors were not allowed to participate in both pro-
6Citizens who were excluded from the program included: those that were receiving government
provided shelter; those that were receiving a living subsidy for being physically and/or mentally disabled;
senior farmers and veterans receiving a welfare allowance; extremely poverty-stricken senior citizens that
were receiving a welfare subsidy; those in the military that were receiving a lifetime living subsidy and
a retirement beneﬁt; those that worked for a government agency (including public schools); and ﬁnally
those that were imprisoned.
7This process shall not take more than 20 days.
8The allowance was cash, and thus there was no restriction on how a beneﬁciary could spend the
transfer payment.
8grams. Thus, the Senior Citizen Welfare Living Allowance accounted for roughly 50% of
the non-farming senior population.
3. Data and Empirical Strategy
We construct our sample from the PSFD, which is a nationally representative, longi-
tudinal survey that was conducted in Taiwan from 1999 to 2006. The PSFD constructed
their survey sample using a three-stage stratiﬁed random sampling technique. The ﬁrst
wave of the sample included individuals born between 1953 and 1964. In 2000, respon-
dents born between 1934 and 1954 were added to the main sample. The PSFD focused
on features of the Taiwanese family that included the interaction among family members,
family resource allocation, and living arrangements. Most importantly, for our purposes,
it collected information on intergenerational transfers between parents and children.9
The PSFD asks respondents two questions about the amount of monetary assistance
given to their parents. The ﬁrst question reads “During the last year, did you provide
your parents loans, living expenses and red envelope?”10 The second question reads “If
yes, what was the monthly amount?” With the responses to these two questions we are
able to see whether respondents gave positive monetary transfers to their parents, and
if so, the monthly amount given. Unfortunately, there is less information about the
quantity of public transfers received by respondents’ parents. The respondents are only
asked if their parents received social welfare beneﬁts during the last year. In addition
this question was only asked in the 2002, 2004, and 2006 surveys. Thus, we will only be
able to study the eﬀect on private transfers of a parent receiving a positive amount of
public transfers, rather than the eﬀect of a marginal increase in public transfers, and we
will be constrained to only using the surveys conducted in 2002, 2004, and 2006.
9In 2000, the survey interviewed the children (aged 16 to 22) of the main respondents with follow-up
interviews conducted every two years. Starting from 2003, children of the main respondents over the age
of 25 were also included as part of the main sample.
10In Taiwan and other East Asian societies, a red envelope is a monetary gift which is given during
holidays or special occasions.
9Despite this one drawback, the PSFD has many advantages over other datasets used
in this literature. It contains fairly detailed information on the demographic and eco-
nomic characteristics of respondents, including age, gender, marital status, educational
levels, health status, employment status, total family income, and living arrangements
(in particular, whether the respondent lives with his or her parents). The PSFD also asks
respondents about basic demographic characteristics of their parents, including their age,
educational attainment, whether they receive retirement income, whether they take care
of grandchildren, and whether one of the parents has a serious health problem. Thus, we
are able to control for characteristics of both the donor (adult children) and the recipient
(elderly parent).
We pool together the 2002, 2004, and 2006 PSFD surveys, which provides 12,343
observations. However, we do not use all of these observations in our baseline sample
because of the following restrictions that we impose: First, we restrict our sample to
respondents who have at least one living parent. Second, we impose a minimum parental
age requirement of 50 years and a minimum age requirement of 25 for the (child) respon-
dent, because we want to conﬁne our analysis to adult children who are economically
independent of their parents. We also impose a parental maximum age limit of 95, a
maximum respondent age of 65, and drop 82 observations that reported a monthly trans-
fer amount greater than NT$50,000 ($1,600). After excluding observations with missing
values for our chosen set of control variables that we describe below, we are left with a
ﬁnal sample of 4,864 individuals.
Table 1 lists summary statistics for the full sample of respondents (column 1), while
in Table 2 we break the sample into the respondents who report that their parents receive
government support and the respondents who report that their parents do not receive
any government assistance. The top panel in both tables lists the characteristics of the
parents while the bottom panel lists the characteristics of the respondents. The variables
included in the tables are all included in our set of control variables (xi below).
Most of the respondents in our sample are middle-aged (average of 42 years), but
10there is a lot of variation in age as the standard deviation is 10 years. Approximately
69% of respondents reported giving their parents cash transfers during the previous
year, and the average monthly amount of transfers given, for those who gave something,
was NT$5,101 ($160).11 The high incidence of private transfers is consistent with our
expectations. Transfers from children have traditionally been the primary income source
for the elderly due to the social culture in Taiwan and the lack of a national pension
program. Thus, unlike most existing studies in this literature, we focus on monetary
transfers from children (donors) to parents (receivers).
In the full sample, approximately 42% of parents receive government social bene-
ﬁts. According to Table 2, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in private transfer behavior
between the respondents whose parents receive social beneﬁts and those whose parents
did not receive social beneﬁts. Parents that receive government assistance are about 6
percentage points more likely to receive private transfers from their children compared
to parents that do not receive public transfers. This is suggestive of a crowding in eﬀect
as opposed to crowding out. However, diﬀerences across the two groups in the amount of
transfers received (conditional on receiving something), suggests a crowding out eﬀect.
Respondents whose parents receive government assistance donate NT$1,800 less com-
pared to those whose parents do not receive government help. Of course these numbers
are simply raw averages, and should be treated with caution in light of the endogeneity
issues discussed above. There are also signiﬁcant diﬀerence in other attributes across
these two groups. Parents who receive government assistance are considerably older,
in worse health, have lower education, and are less likely to receive retirement income.
Respondents with parents that receive government support are considerably older, more
likely to be married, are in worse health, have lower education, and are less likely to live
with their parents.
In this paper we are interested in estimating the crowding out eﬀect of public transfers
on both the intensive and extensive margins of private transfer reception. To estimate
11Most respondents (94%) do not report receiving transfers from their parents (not shown in tables).
11the eﬀect on the extensive margin we use a probit speciﬁcation:
Pr[Di = 1|Gi,xi] = Φ(β1Gi + x′
iβ2) (1)
where Di takes the value of 1 if respondent i provides cash transfers to his or her parents
and 0 otherwise, Gi takes the value of 1 if the respondent’s parents receive government
transfers and 0 otherwise, xi is a vector of control variables that include the character-
istics of both the respondent and the parent(s) listed in Tables 1 and 2, and Φ(·) is the
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
To estimate the eﬀect on the intensive margin we use a Tobit speciﬁcation to account
for the large fraction of respondents that do not provide any transfers to their parents:
Fi = max[0,γ1Gi + x′
iγ2 + εi] (2)
where Fi represents the amount of private transfers that respondent i gives to his or her
parents.
The coeﬃcients of interest are β1 and γ1, which represent the eﬀect of government
assistance on the probability of receiving private transfers and on the amount received.
The estimation of equations (1) and (2), however, is problematic due to the potential
endogeneity of parents’ welfare status, Gi. First, parents who expect to receive or are
receiving monetary support from their children may have less of an incentive to apply for
government assistance programs. Second, unobservable characteristics may be correlated
with both the receipt of government transfers and the receipt of private transfers.
For example, we do not have information regarding parents’ income. Seniors with low
ﬁnancial resources are more likely to qualify for government assistance programs, and are
more likely to apply for such programs even conditional on being eligible. At the same
time parents with low ﬁnancial means are more likely to receive assistance from their
children. This combination would create an upward bias on the estimates of β1 and γ1,
12and cause us to underestimate the crowding out eﬀect of public transfers.12
To deal with this endogeneity problem, we form a set of instruments based on the
introduction of the Senior Citizen Welfare Living Allowance.13 As we discussed above,
beginning in 2002, Taiwanese citizens older than 65 years old have beneﬁted from the Al-
lowance program. Thus, we expect parents’ welfare status, Gi to be positively correlated
with the introduction of the program in 2002. We have one year of data (2001) before
the introduction of the program, and two years of data after the introduction (2003 and
2005). Figure 1 shows the probability of parents receiving government transfers by age
and year.14 Note that the PSFD survey asks about private transfers given and received
and public transfers received during the previous year. Thus, the numbers in Figure
1 represent the probability of receiving public transfers in the year prior to the survey
year (so the 2002 survey asks about transfers in 2001). In addition, this implies that age
of eligibility for the Allowance program is actually 66 in the survey years. The ﬁgure
shows the fraction of parents that received government assistance in the 2002 survey was
basically linearly increasing in age, from 0 at age 63 to about 0.6 at age 75, with no
discernible jump at age 66. In contrast, there is a more pronounced, discrete jump from
the age of 65 to 66 in both the 2004 and 2006 surveys. The jump is much larger in 2006
(slightly less than 0.1 to 0.4) compared to 2004 (0.1 to 0.25). Diﬀerences between the
2004, 2006 surveys and the 2002 surveys remain persistent beyond the age of 66 at about
20-30 percentage points.15
12The bias could also go the other way. For example, parents with a disadvantaged background
(lower wealth and lower income) may be more likely to apply for social beneﬁt programs, and their adult
children, who grew up in the same disadvantaged environment, are likely to have fewer resources to
support their parents in old age. Since we do not have information on the amount of wealth of either the
respondents or the parents, estimates of β1 and γ1 would be biased downward and we would estimate
a crowding out eﬀect that is too large. However, we do have information on the income levels of the
respondents, which should somewhat alleviate this bias.
13With our data, we could also try to address the endogeneity problem using a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator
since many individual characteristics are likely to remain constant over a short time horizon like our
5-year period. However, parents’ income and the expectation of receiving private transfers could still
change across years, and the longitudinal dimension of our data is only 3 years, which is too short to
perform a precise ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation.
14Parents’ age is deﬁned as follows: if both parents are alive, we set the age equal to the maximum
of the two. If the respondent has only one living parent, we set the age equal to the age of the living
parent.
15While we cut the graph oﬀ at age 75 to focus on the discontinuity at age 66, the diﬀerence remains
13Figure 1 provides strong evidence that the Allowance program signiﬁcantly increased
the fraction of elderly Taiwanese citizens that received government transfers. We use
the variation in the receipt of social beneﬁts from the Allowance program to identify
the crowding out eﬀect of public transfers. We use the parameters of the Allowance
program—parents’ age and the year that the Allowance program took eﬀect, 2002—to
generate instruments for the receipt of government transfers, Gi. Speciﬁcally we form
two instrumental variables: interaction terms between a dummy variable indicating that
at least one parent is over the age of 65 and the two survey years after the implementation
of the Allowance program, 2004 and 2006.
We use an IV probit to estimate the crowding out eﬀect on the extensive margin
of private transfer receipt and an IV tobit to estimate the crowding out eﬀect on the
intensive margin.16 The ﬁrst stage regression for both models, is
Gi = δ0 + δ1xi + δ2Zi + ηi (3)
where Zi is the vector of instruments, xi is the vector of controls listed in Tables 1 and
2, and equations (1) and (3) as well as equations (2) and (3) are jointly estimated by
maximum likelihood.
Our identifying assumption is that the parameters of the Allowance program (age re-
quirement and year implemented) only aﬀect private transfer behavior indirectly through
their eﬀect on whether a senior receives public assistance, Gi, and therefore, are not cor-
related with any unobserved variables that aﬀect private transfer behavior (the residuals
in equations 1 and 2). Speciﬁcally, we are assuming that no other government program
or policy targeted at the senior population (above 65) that may also have aﬀected private
through the maximum age in our sample of 95.
16We chose to use an IV strategy as opposed to a pure diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy
for several reasons. First, we have information on whether or not elderly parents receive public transfers,
and by using the variation in this variable created by the parameters of the Allowance program, we
are able to more directly address the crowding out question compared to a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences design. In addition, there appears to be signiﬁcant dissimilarities between the treatment
group (adult children with parents older than 65 years old) and control group (adult children with
younger parents). The identiﬁcation assumption inherent in a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy is likely
to be violated because the time-trend in transfer behaviors between these two groups may be diﬀerent.
14transfer behavior was implemented at the same time as the Allowance program. To our
knowledge, no such program exists.17
As we noted above, our vector of control variables xi is composed of the demographic
and income variables in Tables 1 and 2, and in addition includes a set of year dummies to
control for aggregate shocks that might impact private transfer behavior and the fraction
of seniors that seek government assistance.18
4. Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimated eﬀects of receiving public transfers on the exten-
sive and intensive margins of private transfer behavior, respectively. As discussed above,
we use a probit speciﬁcation to estimate the crowding out eﬀect on the extensive margin,
and a Tobit speciﬁcation to estimate the crowding out eﬀect on the intensive margin.
These results are reported in the ﬁrst column of the tables. In the second column, we re-
port the IV estimates that address the potential endogeneity of receiving public transfers.
We also present OLS and linear two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates as robustness
checks. For brevity, we report only the estimated coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects asso-
ciated with the receipt of public transfers and the coeﬃcient estimates associated with
our instruments in the ﬁrst-stage regressions.
According to the estimation results reported in column 1 of Table 3, parents that
receive social beneﬁts are considerably more likely to receive monetary transfers from
their children. The estimated marginal eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level
17A less important consideration is whether the Allowance program is correlated with the income of
seniors (which we do not observe) based on income eligibility requirements. If so, then our instruments
would be less powerful as a smaller fraction of the elderly Taiwanese population would qualify for the
program. However, from our detailed discussion of the program in section 2.2 above, the income cap that
deﬁnes eligibility into the program is quite high relative to the distribution of income of senior Taiwanese
citizens, so that the income cap should not bind for the vast majority of parents in our sample.
18In addition, we tried including the number of siblings, number of brothers, number of sisters, the
number of times visiting parents in a year, and a set of region dummies, but because they do not eﬀect
our estimates (and are not statistically signiﬁcant themselves), we chose to omit them from our baseline
speciﬁcation. We chose our control set, in part, based on the control set used in Juarez (2009). However,
we have more demographic information than Juarez, as she did not have any information about donors,
and did not have any information about education levels. She did have information about recipients’
income, which we do not have.
15and the magnitude is not trivial. Evaluating the marginal eﬀect at the means of all
other explanatory variables, receiving social beneﬁts increases the likelihood of receiving
transfers from children by approximately 5%. This result suggests that public transfers
crowd in private transfers. The IV estimates reported in column 2, however, reveal
evidence of signiﬁcant crowding out. The estimated probability of providing monetary
assistance to a parent (or parents) falls signiﬁcantly if the parents receive government
assistance. According to the estimated marginal eﬀect, the probability of an adult child
providing monetary transfers to his or her parents decreases by about 50% if the parents
receive public assistance. This is a 55 percentage point decrease compared to the probit
estimate in column 1, and strongly suggests that treating the receipt of public transfers
as exogenous produces a serious upward bias, and leads to an underestimation of the
crowding out eﬀect. As we discussed earlier, the main source of the bias likely comes
from the omission of receivers’ (parents’) income, as well-oﬀ parents are less likely to
receive monetary support from the government as well as from their children, and poorer
parents are more likely to receive assistance from both sources. Finally, the OLS and
2SLS estimates located in columns 3 and 4 are consistent with this interpretation.
The ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcient estimates associated with the instrumental variables are
positive and are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level. These results are
consistent with the evidence from Figure 1 that shows the Allowance program had the
eﬀect of signiﬁcantly increasing the number of Taiwanese senior citizens who received
social beneﬁts.19
Turning to the eﬀect of receiving public assistance on the intensive margin of private
transfer behavior, the Tobit estimates in Table 4 reveal a small and statistically insignif-
icant crowding out eﬀect. In contrast, the IV estimates suggest a much larger crowding
out eﬀect, although they are only marginally signiﬁcant. According to the point esti-
19The value of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (14.604) using 2SLS implies that the null of
weak instruments is rejected based on Stock and Yogo’s (2005) critical values. The Staiger and Stock
“rule of thumb” that the F statistic should be at least 10 for weak identiﬁcation to not be a problem is also
satisﬁed. Moreover, the Hansen J statistic (0.006) over-identiﬁcation test suggests that the instruments
are valid.
16mate, conditional on making a positive transfer, an adult child will reduce monetary
support to his or her parents by an average of NT$2,972 if the parents receive govern-
ment assistance. This is almost the full transfer amount from the Senior Citizen Welfare
Living Allowance program, but again, the estimated eﬀect is imprecisely measured. If
we take into account both the intensive and extensive margins estimates from the Tobit
regression, (i.e. including the respondents that stopped providing monetary support to
their parents after the introduction of the Senior Citizen Welfare Living Allowance pro-
gram), the total estimated eﬀect increases by approximately 40% to NT$4,161 ($130),20
although this point estimate is also imprecisely estimated. It is important to point out
that like the extensive margin results in Table 3, the results in columns 1 and 2 in Table
4 suggest a signiﬁcant downward bias of the crowding out eﬀect if parents’ welfare status
is assumed to be randomly assigned.
The coeﬃcient estimates associated with our set of control variables are mostly con-
sistent with our expectations. Respondents who are male, older, married, employed and
more educated are considerably more likely to make a transfer to their parents and to
make a larger transfer conditional on making a positive one. Moreover, respondents with
older parents have a higher probability of making a transfer. On the other hand, the
likelihood of assisting parents is signiﬁcantly lower for respondents who are unhealthy,
and who live with their parents. Transfer behavior on both the intensive and extensive
margins is considerably lower for respondents whose parents are more educated, and
receive retirement income (in addition to any public transfers).
4.1. Subsample Analysis
Evidence from the literature suggests that the crowding out eﬀect of public transfers
may vary across demographic groups. For example, Cox et al. (2004) found that the
crowding out eﬀect is larger for recipients with low income, and Juarez (2009) found a
20Based on the McDonald and Moﬃt (1980) decomposition, the decrease in the probability of making
a positive transfer is 35%. Due to the limitations of the Tobit model, we chose to perform probit
estimation to estimate the eﬀect on this probability.
17similar result. In this section, we explore whether the crowding out eﬀect is sensitive to
socio-demographiccharacteristics. To do this, we add interaction terms of an indicator for
whether elderly parents receive social beneﬁts and the socio-demographic characteristics
of interest to the set of control variables in equations 1 and 2. We focus on four socio-
demographic characteristics: gender, living arrangements (whether the respondent lives
with his or her parents), parents’ educational attainment (whether at least one of the
parents did not ﬁnish primary schooling), and childrens’ (donors’) income (whether the
respondent’s income is in the lower half of the income distribution). The results are
reported in Table 5.21
In Taiwanese society, traditionally sons have been the primary caregiver for elderly
parents. Therefore, their response to the government transfer program may be diﬀerent
from that of daughters. The estimates from the IV probit models support this prediction,
as the crowding out eﬀect of public transfers on the extensive margin is signiﬁcantly lower
for male respondents compared with female respondents. The intensive margin estimates
also provide evidence of less crowding out for male respondents, though the eﬀect is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
Unlike the U.S., it is quite common in Taiwanese society for adult children to live with
their parents. This is borne out in the data as approximately one-third of respondents in
our sample share a home with their parents. The crowding out eﬀect of public transfers
is much stronger for these respondents, on both the intensive and extensive margins. One
potential explanation for these results is that respondents who live with their parents
may have more information about their parents’ ﬁnancial situation and in particular, the
speciﬁc sources of their income. Thus, it may be the case that children living in separate
homes are not as privy to the exact magnitude and timing of public transfers given to
their parents, or perhaps they are not even aware that their parents are receiving such
transfers in the ﬁrst place. Another possible explanation is that children who live with
their parents may provide more nonmonetary support, such as caring for them when
21We had diﬃculty in obtaining convergence for the maximum-likelihood estimator. Thus, we used
Newey’s two-step estimator with robust standard errors computed by bootstrapping methods.
18they are sick, cleaning the home, and preparing food. If this is the case then as parents’
ﬁnancial situation improves as a result of government transfers, they may ask for less
monetary support from their children.
While we do not have information regarding the income of parents in our sample,
we do have information on their educational attainment, which we expect to be highly
correlated with income. However, we ﬁnd the crowding out eﬀect of public transfers is
similar among parents with diﬀerent levels of educational attainment, as the estimated
eﬀects are small in magnitude and are not statistically signiﬁcant on either the extensive
or intensive margin.
Finally, we look at respondents’ income. Our hypothesis is that the private transfer
behavior of higher income respondents may be less sensitive to the public transfer status
of their parents. We ﬁnd weak evidence supporting such a hypothesis on both the
extensive and intensive margin, as the eﬀects are small in magnitude and none of the
estimated eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant at less than the 10 percent level.
5. Conclusion
Overall, we ﬁnd evidence of a crowding out eﬀect stemming from the introduction
of the Senior Citizen Welfare Living Allowance program in Taiwan. According to our
estimates, receiving government assistance signiﬁcantly decreases the likelihood of an
elderly Taiwanese citizen receiving monetary support from his or her child. Senior citizens
who receive public assistance are approximately 50% less likely to receive transfers from
children compared to senior citizens that do not receive public assistance.22 In addition
to the crowding out eﬀect on the extensive margin of private transfer provision, we ﬁnd
some evidence of crowding out on the intensive margin. Our point estimates of the
crowding out eﬀect on the intensive margin suggests complete crowding out, but are not
measured as precisely as our extensive margin estimates. We ﬁnd that the crowding out
22Note that this number is evaluated at the means of other explanatory variables. The estimated
eﬀects are diﬀerent for individuals with diﬀerent attributes.
19eﬀect is diﬀerent across various subsamples of our data, as private transfer behavior is
more sensitive to public transfer status for male respondents and for respondents that
live with their parents.
These results are somewhat surprising given our knowledge of the social values of
the Taiwanese society. Providing for parents in old age has traditionally been the main
responsibility of children. Thus, one might expect that transfer behavior of children
would be less sensitive to the introduction of a public assistance program relative to
other cultures. Our results, however, contrast with this expectation and are consistent
with recent ﬁndings from other countries, including Juarez (2009).23 These results raise
concerns regarding the eﬀectiveness of social transfer programs, even in a society where
ﬁlial duty is highly valued. In addition, consistent with Juarez (2009), we ﬁnd that
treating social welfare status as an exogenous variable creates signiﬁcant bias and results
in an underestimation of the crowding out eﬀect.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with the predictions of the altruism model, while they
contrast with a commonly parameterized version of the exchange model of private transfer
behavior. In the exchange model an increase in the income of recipients of private
transfers (parents in our case) leads to an increase in the occurrence of transfers and/or
the transfer amount under the assumption that no close market substitutes exist for
the services that recipients provide to their donors (adult children in our case). This
assumption is likely to hold in the context of this paper, as in Taiwan, most childcare
services are provided by relatives or family friends. Due to high costs and uncertain
quality, grandparents are usually the main caregivers for their grandchildren. In addition,
it is also common for elderly parents to provide housekeeping services for their children,
especially when they live in the same household. Thus, if adult children compensate their
parents for these services, and demand for these services is inelastic, the exchange model
23In addition, a recent paper by Lai and Orsuwan (2009) evaluated the crowding out eﬀect of a
diﬀerent social welfare program (Living Allowance for Mid or Low-Income Elders) implemented in 1993
and targeted at relatively poor senior citizens in Taiwan. Using cross-sectional data and a diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences identiﬁcation strategy, they found that a one dollar increase in public transfers reduces
private transfers by 30-50 cents.
20predicts that private transfers will increase as parents’ income increases. Our ﬁnding
of crowding out contradicts this prediction and thus provides evidence of an altruistic
motive behind private transfers.
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22Table 1: Summary Statistics: Full Sample (N = 4,864)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Parents’ Characteristics
Parents receive social beneﬁts (d) 0.423 0.494 0 1
Max age of parents 71 11 50 95
Parents receive pensions (d) 0.092 0.289 0 1
Parents took care of grandchildren (Age= 3) (d) 0.022 0.146 0 1
The parent is unhealthy (d) 0.053 0.224 0 1
Education
Secondary (d) 0.144 0.351 0 1
College (d) 0.090 0.286 0 1
Respondents’ Characteristics
Positive cash transfers to parents (d) 0.685 0.464 0 1
Monthly transferred to parents ($NT thousands) 5.101 6.609 0 49.357
Age 42 10 25 65
Male (d) 0.520 0.500 0 1
Married (d) 0.454 0.498 0 1
# of children under 18 0.787 1.023 0 4
Education
Primary (d) 0.112 0.316 0 1
Secondary (d) 0.331 0.471 0 1
College (d) 0.260 0.439 0 1
Unhealthy (d) 0.088 0.284 0 1
Employed (d) 1 0 0 1
Total income ($NT thousands) in 2002 688 912 0 20,036
At least one parent is over 65 (d) 0.675 0.469 0 1
# of living parents 1.594 0.491 1 2
Living with parents (d) 0.330 0.470 0 1
Source: Authors’ calculations using the PSFD for the years 2002, 2004, and 2006. The top panel displays
summary statistics of parents’ characteristics for the full sample (respondents over the age of 25 with
at least one living parent between the ages of 50 and 95) while the bottom panel displays summary
statistics of respondents’ characteristics. All variables are included as covariates in the estimation. All
dollar amounts are translated to 2002 dollars based on the Taiwanese CPI.
23Table 2: Summary Statistics: Subsample
Parents Receive Social Beneﬁts
Yes No
N = 2,056 N = 2,808
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Parents’ Characteristics
Parents receive social beneﬁts (d) 1 0 0 0
Max age of parents 76 8 66 11
Parents receive pensions (d) 0.036 0.188 0.133 0.340
Parents took care of grandkids (Age= 3) (d) 0.008 0.091 0.032 0.175
The parent is unhealthy (d) 0.086 0.281 0.028 0.166
Education
Secondary (d) 0.060 0.238 0.205 0.404
College (d) 0.049 0.216 0.119 0.324
Respondents’ Characteristics
Positive cash transfers to parents (d) 0.721 0.449 0.660 0.474
Monthly transferred to parents ($NT thousands) 4.122 5.302 5.884 6.516
Age 47 8 38 10
Male (d) 0.512 0.500 0.526 0.499
Married (d) 0.517 0.500 0.408 0.492
# of children under 18 0.778 1.029 0.795 1.019
Education
Primary (d) 0.151 0.358 0.084 0.278
Secondary (d) 0.304 0.460 0.351 0.477
College (d) 0.159 0.366 0.335 0.472
Unhealthy (d) 0.118 0.322 0.067 0.249
Employed (d) 0.735 0.441 0.822 0.383
Total income ($NT thousands) in 2002 663 1059 706 787
At least one parent is over 65 (d) 0.954 0.210 0.470 0.499
# of living parents 1.458 0.498 1.694 0.461
Living with parents (d) 0.263 0.440 0.379 0.485
Source: Authors’ calculations using the PSFD for the years 2002, 2004, and 2006. The top panel displays
summary statistics of parents’ characteristics (respondents over the age of 25 with at least one living
parent between the ages of 50 and 95) while the bottom panel displays summary statistics of respondents’
characteristics.
24Table 3: Extensive Margin Estimation Results
Dependent Variable = 1 if respondent gives cash transfers to parent(s)
Probit IV Probit OLS 2SLS
Parents receive social beneﬁts (d) 0.150*** -1.500*** 0.048*** -0.693**
(0.053) (0.388) (0.017) (0.281)
Marginal Eﬀect 0.047*** -0.509***
(0.017) (0.131)
First-stage coeﬃcients on IV
At least one parent over 65*2004 0.174***
(0.046)
At least one parent over 65*2006 0.255***
(0.049)
Number of observations 4,864 4,864 4,864 4,864
Estimation: Maximum Likelihood for Probit and IV Probit. Sample: Respondents between ages 25 and
65 (inclusive) with at least one living parent between the ages of 50 and 95. The set of covariates in
all estimations includes year dummies, a cubic polynomial in the age of the respondent, the maximum
age of the parents, and the variables listed in Tables 1 and 2. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis
and are clustered at the household level. The endogenous variable of interest is whether parents receive
social beneﬁts, and the instruments are the interactions of a dummy variable indicating that at least
one parent is over the age of 65 and a dummy for each year after the program started (2003 and 2005).
***, **, * Corresponds to statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
25Table 4: Intensive Margin Estimation Results
Dependent Variable = Amount of cash transfers respondent gives to parent(s)
Tobit IV Tobit OLS 2SLS
Parents receive social beneﬁts (d) -0.222 -6.932* -0.433** -2.436
(0.280) (4.164) (0.205) (2.606)
Marginal Eﬀect, E(T|T > 0) -0.099 -2.972*
(0.125) (1.749)
Marginal Eﬀect, E(T) -0.142 -4.161*
(0.179) (2.365)
First-stage coeﬃcients on IV
At least one parent over 65*2004 0.170***
(0.049)
At least one parent over 65*2006 0.254***
(0.050)
Number of observations 4,864 4,864 4,864 4,864
Estimation: Maximum Likelihood for Probit and IV Probit. Sample: Respondents between ages 25 and
65 (inclusive) with at least one living parent between the ages of 50 and 95. The set of covariates in
all estimations includes year dummies, a cubic polynomial in the age of the respondent, the maximum
age of the parents, and the variables listed in Tables 1 and 2. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis
and are clustered at the household level. The endogenous variable of interest is whether parents receive
social beneﬁts, and the instruments are the interactions of a dummy variable indicating that at least
one parent is over the age of 65 and a dummy for each year after the program started (2003 and 2005).
***, **, * Corresponds to statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
26Table 5: Subsample Results
IV Probit 2SLS IV Tobit 2SLS
Parents receive social beneﬁts (d) -1.427 -0.507* -3.809 -0.725
(0.873) (0.273) (4.802) (2.798)
Respondent income in lower half of distribution interaction -0.052 0.022 0.634 0.226
(0.161) (0.064) (0.940) (0.660)
Parents education ≥ primary schooling interaction 0.022 0.025 -0.678 -0.825
(0.336) (0.095) (1.613) (1.107)
Living with parents interaction -0.486*** -0.142** -2.987*** -1.976**
(0.188) (0.068) (0.993) (0.796)
Respondent is male interaction 0.576*** 0.165** 1.525 0.712
(0.203) (0.064) (0.986) (0.698)
These are coeﬃcient estimates associated with the interaction of an indicator for whether parents receive
social beneﬁts and various socio-demographic characteristics of interest. Sample: Respondents between
ages 25 and 65 (inclusive) with at least one living parent between the ages of 50 and 95. The set of
covariates in all estimations includes year dummies, a cubic polynomial in the age of the respondent,
the maximum age of the parents, and the variables listed in Tables 1 and 2. Standard errors are listed
in parenthesis and are clustered at the household level. The endogenous variable of interest is whether
parents receive social beneﬁts, and the instruments are the interactions of a dummy variable indicating
that at least one parent is over the age of 65 and a dummy for each year after the program started (2003
and 2005). ***, **, * Corresponds to statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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